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13. Regional integration and migration in the 
European Union
Simon McMahon
INTRODUCTION
Throughout history migration has been a defining characteristic of 
European society, visible in networks of soldiers and tradesmen stretching 
across the Roman Empire, in patterns of commerce between the conti-
nent’s medieval city- regions or in flows of refugees escaping persecution 
and destruction during two world wars. Nevertheless, despite this long 
history of population movements it is the politics of immigration in the 
second half of the twentieth and the early twenty- first centuries that 
deserve particularly close inspection. During this period, much of the 
continent has taken part in the development of the European Union (EU), 
a common system of governance, bundling the member states’ economic 
and political authority in binding treaties and shared institutions. At the 
same time, leaders of many European states have also made increasingly 
significant efforts to control and manage the arrival of migrants to their 
countries, whilst often criticising the EU for weakening their own border 
controls and increasing the arrival of undocumented immigrants and 
organised crime in their countries (see, e.g., Guardian 2012). International 
migration and the development of the EU have thus together been inter-
preted as an affront to the sovereign control of national governments, to 
determine who can reside in their space, aggravating the deterritorialisa-
tion or undermining of the nation state by globalisation (Joppke 1998; 
Sassen 1996; Soysal 1994).
In response to such concerns, member states and EU institutions were 
understood by researchers to have looked to build a ‘Fortress Europe’ 
through a securitised policy approach aimed at restricting migration and 
strengthening border controls. Indeed, the lexicon of Fortress Europe has 
also entered the popular imagination, featuring often in press reporting1 
as well as studies on the topic (e.g. Carr 2012) and even being voiced by 
security guards and non- governmental organisation (NGO) practitioners 
(Feldman 2012: 86–8). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the regula-
tion of migration has not only focused on restriction. On the one hand, 
mobility within the EU has been a central interest in the establishment of a 
TALANI PRINT.indd   285 18/06/2015   11:43
286  The regional dimension of migration
common internal market of free movement of goods, capital, services and 
workers. On the other hand, although policies aimed at controlling the 
arrival of third- country nationals (from outside the EU) may have been 
motivated initially by restricting their access (Boswell 2003; Guiraudon 
2000; Huysmans 2000; Lavenex 2006; Schierup et al. 2008), they should 
now be seen as part of a selective process of allowing some groups of 
migrants to enter and move between member states whilst restricting the 
movement of others.
This chapter gives an overview of the relationship between the economic 
and political integration of the EU and the development of an increasingly 
elaborate shared framework of migration policies. In doing so, it addresses 
two main issues. Firstly, it explores the key terms of the EU’s migration 
policy. Much scholarship has emphasised the development of security 
measures to attempt to manage the movement of people into and within 
the EU. Yet, although security represents a significant part of the common 
migration policy, controls on migration to the EU have arisen at the same 
time as there have been efforts to promote mobility within it. Secondly, 
the chapter explores the role of, and relationships between, suprana-
tional institutions and national governments in this field in the complex 
system of EU governance. The EU institutions, national governments 
and non- governmental organisations have a stake in today’s common EU 
migration policy, but the capacity of member states to decide who enters 
and resides in their countries and under which conditions has not been 
entirely undermined. Rather, the EU has provided important channels 
and  opportunities for contestation and policy change which ministries and 
departments in national governments have adapted to.
The chapter has three principal sections. Firstly, it presents an overview 
of theoretical approaches to understanding the integration of the EU and 
the development of a common migration policy. Secondly, it covers the 
history of the development of this field. Thirdly, it summarises the findings 
in the conclusions at the end.
EXPLAINING THE INTEGRATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION
The EU is a unique organisation in contemporary international relations. 
At the heart of the European project has been a series of institutions 
which are considered to be supranational due to having the capacity 
to pass and uphold legislation which is binding for participating states. 
This distinguishes it from international organisations. Yet it does not go 
so far as to become a state, because national governments  continue to 
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hold sovereignty and authority to act independently on a range of policy 
issues.
The first stages of the process which has come to be known as the inte-
gration of the EU arose from the particular conditions found in Europe 
following the Second World War. The Treaty of Paris, forming the 
European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, and the Treaty of Rome, 
forming the European Economic Community in 1957, looked towards 
the creation of policies and institutions to regulate a common market in 
specific goods. The foundations of the common market would be defined 
as the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and people among 
states in the Community. Further specific policies to achieve the common 
market came as part of Economic and Monetary Union in the 1990s and 
the implementation of a single currency, the euro, entering into circulation 
in 2002 and currently (at the time of writing in 2015) in use in 18 member 
states. Over this time, the early institutions of the 1950s have merged into a 
shared administration (the Commission) with an accompanying European 
Court of Justice and a directly elected European Parliament, as well as 
bodies for the representatives of national governments in the form of the 
European Council and the Council of Ministers. Today, the EU covers an 
‘area of freedom, security and justice’ which has been enlarged to a total of 
27 member states and has influence in a considerable range of economic, 
political and social policy fields.
European studies have often sought to explain this process of economic 
and political integration through the lens of either neofunctionalism 
or liberal intergovernmentalism. Neofunctionalism, on the one hand, 
describes integration as a gradual and progressive shift of political author-
ity from nation states to a supranational political community. In the words 
of E.B. Haas, this is driven by political actors and non- governmental elites 
being ‘persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activi-
ties toward a new centre, whose institutions demand jurisdiction over the 
pre- existing national states’ (Haas 1958: 16). Integration occurs through 
spillover, whereby cooperation in one area results in unforeseen implica-
tions which bring about a need for increased cooperation in other areas. 
The establishment of supranational institutions thus sees them take on 
a life of their own in order to resolve subsequent problems and increase 
their power (Niemann and Schmitter 2009: 48). On the other hand, liberal 
intergovernmentalists describe integration as the outcome of specific 
negotiations between nation states (Moravscik 1991, 1993, 1998). This 
view assumes that states are the principal actors in international relations 
and that their policy positions are based on aggregated domestic inter-
ests. States agree to integration in specific policy areas, this view holds, 
because the EU provides an opportunity for them to reduce transaction 
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costs for their domestic interests. Cooperation is the result of intergovern-
mental bargaining, and when this results in sovereignty being given up to 
supranational institutions it is because states have chosen to delegate it in 
exchange for benefits for their constituents (Moravcsik 1998).
This is not the place to enter into an extended review of the merits 
and shortcomings of neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism 
(indeed, this has been done elsewhere, such as in the chapters of Wiener 
and Diez 2009). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the study of 
common approaches to migration policy in the EU demands a more 
nuanced perspective beyond the neofunctionalist–liberal intergovern-
mentalist dichotomy. The difficulty lies primarily in the way that these 
paradigms emphasise the role in EU policymaking of either the member 
states or supranational elites and institutions. Yet europeanisation has 
opened up channels and opportunities for political actors, sometimes from 
national governments and sometimes not, to develop shared approaches 
to common policy problems. For example, Geddes has shown how the 
EU institutions have opened new spaces for ‘transnational advocacy’ 
groups to mobilise politically and make demands for migrants’ rights 
(Geddes 2008). He argues that the technocratic nature of the Commission, 
the Court of Justice and the Parliament means that they have been more 
amenable to technical expertise than national governments, which were 
susceptible to public opinion. At the same time, moreover, it has been 
noted by others that the EU migration field has also responded to the 
interests of member states by facilitating the expansion of a security- based 
agenda aimed at controlling migration (Kostakoupolous 2000; Talani 
2014). In this vein, Guiraudon has shown that the EU could become the 
chosen arena for cooperation on migration issues due to the presence of 
flexible and informal groups of decision- makers in Brussels, which pro-
vided civil servants from national interior ministries with an opportunity 
to develop a shared approach to migration, asylum and crime- related 
issues whilst avoiding constraints posed by national judiciaries, exclud-
ing potential adversaries and being able to co- opt allies in sending and 
transit  countries (Guiraudon 2000: 261–8). This has been termed ‘venue- 
shopping’. Guiraudon (2000:  268) concludes that ‘it is misleading to 
consider, as liberal intergovernmentalism does, that domestic actors come 
to the international bargaining table representing aggregated (domestic) 
interests. Instead, certain domestic actors bypass the process of interest 
aggregation by mobilizing in international venues’.
Alternative explanations for the development of a common EU migra-
tion policy from the field of critical security studies have adopted a con-
structivist view. These studies focus on the spillover of political attention 
from the economic integration of the single market to security concerns 
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regarding migration control. Nevertheless, rather than suggesting that 
there is a functional linkage between these policy fields, these studies 
argue that spillover is the result of the construction of shared under-
standings of migration as a security threat by national political actors, 
which justify the expansion of their control over freedom of population 
movements (Bigo 2005; Huysmans 2000, 2006). In particular, Huysmans 
has examined how the 1980s saw migration become increasingly associ-
ated with concerns regarding public order, the future of the welfare state 
and the cultural composition of the nation in policy debates in Europe 
(Huysmans 2000: 756). Migration was understood as an existential threat 
to nation states which required security policies and measures in response 
due to the development of the internal market and the concern that the 
abolition of internal borders would result in a loss of control and rule of 
law (ibid.: 758). As noted also by Guiraudon, this was not a response to 
functionally linked, existent policy problems, but rather an anticipation 
by members of national governments of future possible problems associ-
ated with a loss of control through the formation of the single market 
whilst responding to anti- immigrant sentiment in their national political 
constituencies (Huysmans 2000: 252–4). As per Guiraudon’s argument, 
Huysmans demonstrates that national interior ministries pushed the first 
stages of cooperation on migration policy through informal Brussels- 
based groups in which they explicitly linked freedom of movement to 
security, enabling states to point the direction of migration policy.
The securitisation literature urges us to adopt a perspective which does 
not view states or EU institutions as unitary bodies, but rather looks at 
how actors from nation states have managed to develop new methods 
of migration control through the opportunities presented in Brussels. 
More recently, such internal workings of the EU institutions have been 
illustrated in detail by Feldman’s notion of a ‘migration apparatus’: 
a political and social system made up of public and private actors in 
member states, EU agencies and national governments of third countries 
who come together and learn to speak a common language of migration 
management (Feldman 2012). Feldman notes that the EU, as with other 
contemporary governance systems, ‘shifts the responsibility of public 
order away from the classic centralized administrative state – the raison 
d’etat [sic] – and toward a plethora of other agencies that encourage indi-
vidual productivity, normality and entrepreneurialism’ (ibid.: 13). This 
does not mean that the state does not matter, but rather that its power is 
mobilised in multiple, differing ways. Feldman also argues that the EU 
has now taken on a vital role in the management of migration through 
the provision of informal arenas for discussion and networking, as well 
as the production of knowledge through research and monitoring of the 
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risk posed by migration levels. This creates an ‘agreed upon set of lenses 
through which they collectively look, so to speak, at the migration situa-
tion “on the ground”’ (ibid.: 76). Andersson has also shown how, as well 
as national governments, a whole industry of private security companies, 
data analysts and NGOs seeking to benefit from funding made available 
by the EU has sprung up around a shared view of the risks posed by migra-
tion (Andersson 2014). The outcome is what he has called an ‘illegality 
industry’ in which the emphasis of risks, not only to the places of migrant 
arrival but also to countries of origin and the migrants themselves, serves 
to justify ever- increasing financial investment and technological develop-
ment along the EU’s borders with the global South. With monitoring and 
control tools now reaching further along migration routes and into multi-
ple countries, particularly in Africa, Andersson suggests that there is little 
end in sight to this spillover in anticipation of a suggested security threat.
Yet, although controlling the arrival of migrants has undoubtedly been 
a significant concern (Boswell 2003; Guiraudon 2000; Huysmans 2000; 
Lavenex 2006; Schierup et al. 2008), the securitisation literature adopts 
a narrow view of the rationality of political actors by assuming that they 
only wish to restrict and control population movements. Indeed, security- 
based migration policies in the EU have been accompanied by a selective 
process of allowing some groups of migrants to enter and move between 
member states whilst restricting the movement of others (Boswell and 
Geddes 2011; Geddes 2008). As highlighted by Menz, for example, there 
has been a structural transformation of European states and the EU which 
has promoted a greater involvement of private actors in both migration 
control and collaboration between employers and policymakers on eco-
nomic migration policy (Menz 2009). Hence, ‘the neoliberalized European 
state does not lose sovereignty, nor does it endorse restrictive immigration 
policy. It outsources certain control functions to private sector actors, 
while at the same time opening itself to the input of organized business’ 
(ibid.: 329).
Similarly, Boswell and Geddes have advocated greater awareness of 
the varied dimensions of migration policy in the EU in order to under-
stand the ‘paradox of Europe’s borders’, which they describe as the way 
that ‘the EU and its member states are simultaneously removing some 
borders, relocating others and building new ones’ (Boswell and Geddes 
2011: 12). For them, different parts of political systems have different 
ways of deriving legitimacy from the decision- making process, whether 
talking about policy problems, choosing from their set of possible policy 
choices or implementing decisions in practice. In the contemporary EU 
there is such a range of agencies, interest groups and media, as well as 
national  government departments, that policies are contested at each of 
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these stages (ibid.: 48). Thus, as also noted by Simon Hix, ‘as in all demo-
cratic polities, demands in the EU arise from a complex network of public 
and private groups, each competing to influence the EU policy process to 
promote or protect their own interests or desires’ (Hix 2004: 3). Similarly, 
Wallace has noted that ‘the longer history of what we now know as the 
European Union is one of more segmented political contestation and 
engagement on specific policy issues – among states, within states, and 
across states’ (Wallace 2010: 349). As a result, in order to understand 
migration policy outcomes, our analysis must view not only how immigra-
tion is constructed and with what effects, but how this is grounded within 
and channelled by the varying political opportunities at different levels of 
governance in the EU. With this in mind, I will now look at the specific 
development of migration policies.
A COMMON MIGRATION POLICY
This section presents an overview of the development of migration policies 
within the EU. There is unfortunately not enough space to cover all of the 
areas of migration policy in detail, although this has been done effectively 
elsewhere (e.g. Boswell and Geddes 2011). The aim here is rather to high-
light a prevailing concern with security in migration cooperation as well as 
the relationship of this to mobility and the creation of a common market 
characterised by free movement, whilst drawing out the relationships 
between states and EU institutions in this field.
Early Beginnings
During the early years of the European project, there was little coopera-
tion on international migration, although the seeds were sown of some 
of the key characteristics of the contemporary migration field. During 
the 1950s and 1960s migration was desired in many European countries, 
above all in the Northern European ones of the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands (Boswell 2003; Huysmans 2000; 
Schierup et al. 2008). They maintained their own migration policies, often 
distinguishing between countries of origin according to whether they had 
previously had a colonial relationship with them. Formal labour oppor-
tunities and employment contracts were often offered in the society of 
origin, although undocumented migrants could also find opportunities in 
their host societies. For example, Huysmans (2000) has noted that agen-
cies in France specialised in recruiting foreign workers in the country of 
origin without necessarily following legal immigration procedures. These 
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migrants constituted a cheap, efficient and beneficial workforce to their 
host societies’ redevelopment following the Second World War, although 
their presence was intended to be temporary. As a result, there was little 
interest in cooperation to regulate migration flows from such countries.
Nevertheless, this view subsequently changed, with national govern-
ments increasingly looking to cooperate on border control measures at 
the European level. In a context of economic recession and high unem-
ployment in the 1970s and 1980s, public opinion and political discourse 
in many countries associated immigration with labour market competi-
tion and welfare dependency (Schierup et al. 2008). Control and security 
platforms saw national politicians promise to close national borders to 
immigrants (Huysmans 2000). At the same time, Regulation 1612/68 (in 
1968) outlined the capacity of any national of a member state, irrespective 
of their place of residence, to move freely across the European Community 
for reasons of work. This was accompanied by fears in national govern-
ments of negative spillover, whereby reduced control of population move-
ments within the Community would require increased security measures in 
order to prevent an explosion of cross- border crime, international terror-
ism and illegal immigration (Boswell 2003; Huysmans 2000; Talani 2014).
The first major inclusion of international migration issues in the 
European treaties came in 1992, with the Maastricht Treaty. Within the 
Treaty’s structure, a pillar on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) housed 
guidelines (not complete policy measures) for asylum, borders, immigrant 
entry and residence, undocumented migration, international judicial, 
customs and police cooperation, and international crime. Significantly, 
the JHA pillar thus grouped asylum and migration with security issues. 
Decision- making on JHA pillar issues also required unanimity within 
the Council of Ministers to be approved, keeping power in the hands of 
national governments.
However, prior to the Maastricht Treaty and against the background of 
the context noted above, interior ministries of national governments did 
look to develop common policy responses to migration through examples 
of flexible cooperation outside of the EU’s treaty architecture. Informal 
forums were formed such as the TREVI Group (1976) and the Ad- Hoc 
Working Group on Immigration (1986) were formed. The TREVI Group 
in particular was a space for discussion of the control of borders and 
the fight against terrorism through enhanced cooperation between law 
enforcement agencies. These groups enabled national ministries to increase 
their autonomy and sidestep institutional restraints in national settings, 
such as judiciaries, opposition groups, and the media and migrant cam-
paigners (Guiraudon 2000; Lavenex 2006). National governments from 
Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France and Germany also signed 
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the Schengen agreement in 1985, which was designed to ensure the abol-
ishment of internal border checks between them whilst also harmonising 
external border controls and increasing security checks and information 
sharing on foreign nationals in their countries. In this way, representa-
tives of national governments were able to develop common approaches 
to controlling population movements into the EU due to technological 
developments in data sharing and opportunities for cooperation between 
interior ministries and security agencies.
The Amsterdam Treaty and Communitarisation of Migration and Asylum?
The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 nevertheless signalled more of a shift in 
momentum towards a common migration policy in the EU. In fact, it did 
so through a split between free movement, visa and asylum policies, on 
the one hand, and police and judicial cooperation on the other. For the 
former, after a five- year transitional period the Commission was granted 
the sole right to initiate policy, and the highest national courts could refer 
cases to the European Court of Justice. This provided the EU institutions 
with the space to establish what was called ‘an area of freedom, security 
and justice’.
However, the policy areas which did not transfer from the control of the 
Council of Ministers to the European Commission were highly significant 
for the shape and direction of migration policies that were to come. These 
were related above all to security issues of terrorism, trafficking, corrup-
tion and racism. Perhaps most significantly, the Schengen agreement was 
incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty as part of this intergovernmental 
field.
The Schengen acquis, as it became known, claimed to establish freedom 
of movement across the Union for nationals of member states as well as 
third- country nationals in possession of a valid visa for one of the member 
states, provided that they fulfilled the entry conditions (except for in the 
UK, Ireland and Denmark, which were able to opt out). However, at the 
same time it also contained a range of security measures to oversee and 
control population movements. An Executive Committee was formed for 
the harmonisation of external borders, whilst internal security controls 
were bolstered by a shared Schengen Information System (SIS), which 
holds an enormous amount of information on movements ranging from 
missing persons and undesirable migrants to stolen property. It has been 
stated that the SIS holds around 700 000 records of people who have been 
found to be ‘illegal’ and refused entry to the Schengen area, for example 
(Broeders and Hampshire 2013: 1209). There was also cooperation 
between police forces, cooperation between legal authorities, cooperation 
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on countering drug trafficking, and harmonisation of rules on extradi-
tion. This has led Bigo to comment that Europe is not territorial, and the 
frontiers of the EU are not fixed nor physically ‘real’, but rather spread 
throughout society in the form of police cooperation, identity documents 
and information sharing (Bigo 2005: 59). Since 2006 this has been further 
developed through the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) (Regulation (EC) 
562/2006), which has set out common rules on checks and controls at 
external border crossings, and an updated information system (SIS II) 
demonstrating how the Schengen agreement continues to represent the 
foundations of EU migration and border control legislation.
For member states, the Schengen agreement’s inclusion in the treaty 
framework has rendered the interdependencies between them more 
explicit. Border control decisions of one country have potential knock- on 
effects in others: border controls are no longer in the exclusive interest 
of the member state at whose external borders the control is supposed to 
occur, as migrants may move between states once they have obtained a 
visa in one country (Carrera et al. 2011). In the EU’s legislative jargon, 
this means that the principle of subsidiarity (that decisions on entry to 
the EU take place at the point of entry), is also underpinned by a prin-
ciple of responsibility (that decisions should take into account the pos-
sible implications for other member states). To compensate, national 
governments are at times able to act independently within the Schengen 
framework, restricting entry and free movement at internal borders and 
revoking the permission given in other member states when justified as a 
security issue or when immigrants are without sufficient means for subsist-
ence. These powers have been evoked repeatedly by a range of member 
states, and despite demands since the passing of the Lisbon Treaty for the 
Commission and Parliament to be consulted in such cases, at the time of 
writing in 2013 it continues to be a member state’s prerogative when to 
reinstate internal border controls (Carrera et al. 2011; McMahon 2012).
A common asylum policy, known as the Dublin Convention, was also 
incorporated into the treaty architecture in 1997. This set out a frame-
work for ensuring that asylum seekers could apply to only one member 
state. It was supported from 2003 by data gathering and sharing through 
the Eurodac database, which registers the biometric data of all asylum 
applicants in EU member states, checking them against previous appli-
cations to ensure there is no repetition (Broeders and Hampshire 2013). 
Nevertheless, the terms and conditions of granting asylum continued 
to be the responsibility of national governments, and acceptance rates, 
timescales for decisions and rights of asylum applicants varied from one 
country to another (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2007).
Despite this increasing cooperation, the result for migrants was a lack 
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of a clear supranational structure setting out and protecting their rights 
(Talani 2014). This has been seen by many as representing the continued 
dominance of national governments to restrict the access of third- country 
nationals to their countries (Guiraudon 2000; Huysmans 2000; Talani 
2014; Ugur 1995). At the same time it facilitated a distinction separating 
policies pertaining to the free movement of nationals of member states 
(responsibility of the Commission) from those referring to third- country 
nationals (driven by national governments).
Beyond Schengen
The developments discussed so far have concerned an increase in migra-
tion policy measures within the EU and along its borders. However, there 
has also been a push for migration controls beyond the Schengen space, 
involving a range of agencies and third- country governments. These are 
significant because they highlight how the roles of supranational institu-
tions and national governments have increasingly become intertwined 
with broader networks of non- governmental agencies and neighbouring 
states. They also illustrate the way in which the image of Fortress Europe 
being surrounded by an insurmountable outer wall can be somewhat 
misleading; migration controls have been operationalised not simply 
by establishing physical boundaries at the edges of the EU’s outermost 
member states, but by measures in a range of locations within and outside 
of Europe. This is particularly clear in the case of the EU’s border agency 
Frontex and its cooperation with sending and transit countries (European 
Council, Tampere SN 200/99, 15/16 Oct 1999).
Frontex was originally established in 2004 (Council Regulation 
2007/2004), yet it does not ‘govern’ the borders of Europe. Rather, its 
key tasks are surveillance of the ‘external borders’ of Europe, risk assess-
ment, research and training of border guards. This is achieved through 
coordinating national and EU systems and responding to member states’ 
calls for support in emergencies to ‘help border authorities work together’ 
(Frontex 2012). This includes providing material resources through inno-
vations such as Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) of national 
border guards which can be sent to work in ‘crisis situations’. Frontex’s 
research and risk assessment reports are also important tools for ‘drama-
tising’ migration issues and giving the image of Europe under threat, as 
well as defining the common language and metrics that give coherence to 
the disparate policies and processes in place across Europe (Andersson 
2014; Boswell and Geddes 2011; Feldman 2012). In this way, Frontex 
constitutes a network of connections between national and EU- level mate-
rial infrastructures and policy officials (Feldman 2012: 85). As noted by 
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one official in an interview with Feldman, ‘we are not building a Fortress 
Europe. We are not building walls. We are establishing connections with 
transit countries’ (quoted in Feldman 2012: 87). Member states can there-
fore use Frontex as a source of economic and material resources to control 
migration, but they must make the choice to come forward and apply for 
them.
At the same time, the EU’s migration control efforts have expanded 
into an ‘external dimension’. Originally mentioned in a Commission com-
munication in 1994 (Geddes 2008: 177) and established in a High Level 
Working Group in 1998, the externalisation of migration control involves 
shifting border management and migration deterrence measures to third 
countries. This ‘external dimension’ of EU immigration and asylum policy 
has been composed of different aspects. There are classical migration 
control instruments such as border controls; measures to prevent undocu-
mented migration, smuggling and trafficking; capacity- building of asylum 
systems; and migration management in transit countries being ‘exported’ 
to sending countries and future member states as part of the accession 
process; as well as the return of asylum seekers and undocumented 
migrants being facilitated through readmission agreements (Boswell 2003: 
622). There are also preventive approaches by which development aid, the 
European Neighbourhood Policy and foreign policy tools are brought 
into a framework of preventing cross- border movement of people by tack-
ling the root causes of migration. Migration control thus moved, quite 
literally, beyond the limits of the Schengen space.
These developments can be seen as an original step towards controlling 
immigration by tying it to socio- economic development in host and transit 
countries. Yet they can also be understood as a continuation of the venue- 
shopping of interior ministries that led to the delegation of capacities to 
the EU level in the 1980s and 1990s (Boswell 2003). Just as national judi-
ciaries could be sidestepped through informal and secretive arrangements 
in the Council of Ministers and on an ad hoc basis between national gov-
ernments, so too could the NGOs, human rights agencies and journalists 
of Brussels be avoided through the moving of decisions and procedures to 
third countries. This has resulted in controversial agreements with coun-
tries such as Libya with a suspect human rights record and questionable 
government practices (Hamood 2008; Paoletti 2011).
External migration controls have also come about as part of a wider 
series of bilateral treaties and conditionality agreements tied into the EU’s 
increasing role in international political and economic cooperation, as is 
particularly clear in developments in its southern neighbourhood (Paoletti 
2011). The Barcelona Declaration of 1995 between the EU and countries 
in the Southern Mediterranean area illustrates how economic relations, 
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international development and security could be tied together under the 
banner of migration management. It proposed Euro–Mediterranean coop-
eration to reduce migratory pressures through vocational training and job 
creation, whilst also seeking to fight against illegal immigration through 
readmittance procedures. Tunisia was the first Maghreb country to ratify 
its association agreement with the EU, and it also signed a readmission 
agreement for undocumented migrants in 2009 (Frontex 2011). The EU 
also agreed to grant funding to Libya for restricting access to migrants 
along the primary land- based migration route from sub- Saharan Africa 
to Benghazi, Tripoli and then Italy (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2011). This was 
followed in 2010 by a Memorandum of Understanding and a Migration 
Cooperation Agenda between the EU and Libya, offering an investment 
of €60 million for the period of 2011–13 to improve public services in 
the country, as well as capacity- building of maritime search and rescue, 
readmittance procedures, and measures to restrict irregular migration 
with Niger to the south and the EU to the north (European Commission 
2010). These efforts to restrict migration flows resulted in irregular depar-
tures from Libya’s coastline stopping almost entirely in 2010 (Frontex 
2011), although they were tested during the opening months of 2011 when 
unrest and political change in Tunisia and Libya resulted in the removal 
of coastal border patrols and repatriation agreements in these countries, 
heralding the arrival of thousands of migrants on the small Italian island 
of Lampedusa (as examined by McMahon 2012).
Such measures reflect how a range of agreements between migration 
sending countries and EU member states (primarily concerned with repa-
triations), as well as with the EU itself (principally on economic devel-
opment) contribute to a European approach to migration control. As a 
result, the common policies and measures designed to manage migration 
to the EU are perhaps better imagined as a network or web of control 
measures dispersed throughout known migration routes, rather than the 
fixed and clearly defined wall of a fortress. This network is maintained 
through a range of international relations between the EU, its member 
states and third countries. Migration management in the EU’s neighbour-
hood is thus now linked with questions of economic relations and interna-
tional development as well as security.
Mobility and Selectivity
This chapter has focused predominantly so far on security measures 
to restriction migration to the EU. In reality, however, the EU and its 
member states have sought to control types of migration, rather than 
restricting all. It is particularly important to note that the security 
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 perspective vis- à- vis third- country nationals has evolved at the same time 
that barriers to mobility between member states have been reduced. This 
illustrates how early developments in migration policies have been insepa-
rable from the process of internal liberalisation of the single market.
Even the early developments of a common migration policy were clearly 
divided between movements between member states and those from 
outside the member states (migration of third- country nationals). Whereas 
the former were outlined in European treaties, the latter remained in the 
hands of national governments. The free movement of persons across 
national borders was established as a fundamental objective of the 
European Community in 1951 with the Treaty of Paris. At Rome in 1957, 
this would be summarised in the collection of free movement rights, made 
up of the right to move freely within Community territory in order to 
accept employment, to reside in another member state for the purpose of 
employment, and to continue residing in a member state after having been 
employed (Maas 2007: 12). As noted briefly above, Regulation 1612/68 
further defined this as any national of a member state, irrespective of their 
place of residence, having ‘the right to take up an activity as an employed 
person, and to pursue such activity, within the territory of another 
Member State in accordance with the provisions laid down by law, regula-
tion or administrative action governing the employment of nationals of 
that State’, as well as having ‘the right to take up available employment 
in the territory of another Member State with the same priority as nation-
als of that State’. The removal of borders to the mobility of Europeans 
between member states was thus framed as a question of labour market 
liberalisation within the broader process of achieving a common market.
Free movement and the rights of nationals of member states was con-
tained within a concept of citizenship of the EU under the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992, according to which ‘every person holding the nationality 
of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union’. This brought a bundle 
of rights under the banner of European citizenship, including being able 
to reside and use services and welfare benefits across the member states, to 
vote and stand in municipal and European Parliament elections, and to be 
treated as equals with the native population, applicable to citizens of the 
EU. These were added to in 2004 by Directive 2004/38/EC which covered 
the rights of EU citizens and family members to move across the EU and 
reside freely in member states (Boswell and Geddes 2011: 177). EU citizens 
can also appeal directly to the European Court of Justice, which can make 
decisions constraining the sovereignty of member states’ courts (2011: 
176). Yet EU citizenship has been criticised as insufficient to be considered 
a true concept of citizenship. For some, it rather signifies merely a series 
of market- oriented rights. Indeed, all EU citizens must demonstrate that 
TALANI PRINT.indd   298 18/06/2015   11:43
The European Union   299
they have sufficient means to support themselves and do not pose a threat 
to security, health or public policy, with the consequence being possible 
removal from the host member state. If they wish to reside in a member 
state for more than six months, EU citizens must also be engaged in eco-
nomic activity or self- employed, in vocational training, have sufficient 
resources or be a family member of a national citizen. As noted by Boswell 
and Geddes (2011: 178), these conditions ‘reveal the economic impetus 
that underlies the mobility and free movement framework’. Yet perhaps 
most importantly, citizenship of the EU is dependent on being a citizen of 
one of the member states: membership of the EU citizenry is only available 
to those granted membership of the national polities of the states.
Finally, this economic focus can also be seen in developments since the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2009. This incorporated migration and asylum into the 
range of ‘normal’ issues with the sole right to initiate policies going to 
the Commission, and qualified majority voting needed from the Council 
of Ministers rather than unanimity. The European Court of Justice can 
also annul legislation and rule on EU institutions’ failure to act, and on 
cases of member states not fulfilling their obligations. As noted elsewhere, 
‘far from being a depoliticized bureaucracy or “impartial broker” between 
Member States [the Commission’s Directorate General for Justice, 
Freedom and Security] developed a clear set of preferences’ (Boswell and 
Geddes 2011: 63). This has included promoting human rights and interna-
tional law as well as favouring the harmonisation of national policies. One 
example is how the Commission has shown itself to be favourable towards 
a selective approach to facilitating highly skilled migration, as noted by 
the then- director Manuel Barroso’s statement when launching an EU Blue 
Card visa scheme:
Labour migration into Europe boosts our competitiveness and therefore our 
economic growth. It also helps tackle demographic problems resulting from our 
ageing population. This is particularly the case for highly skilled labour. With 
today’s proposal for an EU Blue Card we send a clear signal: highly skilled 
migrants are welcome in the EU!2
The Blue Card he mentioned was included within the Council Directive 
2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third- country 
nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, which granted 
highly skilled workers a range of rights related to free movement and 
non- discrimination, similar to long- term residents. The Directive does 
not, however, alter the fact that levels of migrant admissions continue to 
be decided by national governments. Indeed, the Lisbon Treaty states in 
Article 79 that migration measures ‘do not affect the right of Member States 
to determine volumes of admission of third- country nationals coming from 
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third countries to their territory in order to seek work, whether employed 
or self- employed’. The Commission has, rather, provided an opportunity to 
incentivise migrants by increasing the attractiveness of moving to Europe.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has examined the development of a common approach 
to migration in the EU. A clear migration policy field has developed 
in Europe, and this is of particular interest to studies of international 
political economy. The EU is a unique example of regionalisation within 
globalisation, due to the capacity of supranational institutions to pass 
legislation that is binding for the member states. Nevertheless, as has been 
shown here, the integration of the EU has not simply undermined the 
capacity of the nation state to determine international migration policies.
The literature from European studies has typically focused on a 
dichotomy between neofunctionalist and liberal intergovernmentalist 
explanations of integration which do not appear to adequately explain 
the development of migration policy in the EU. For example, despite the 
motivation for cooperation coming from representatives from national 
governments in interior ministries, this was not an expression of an aggre-
gate national interest but rather an effort by certain elements of national 
governments to circumvent national constraints. Although the treaty 
architecture has set out the guidelines and terms of internal movement 
and external borders in the Schengen acquis, member state governments 
have discretion in establishing limits on free movement. Whilst the border 
agency Frontex has played a significant role in building a common lan-
guage, interpretive lenses and monitoring tools used to understand border 
controls and undocumented migration, it only coordinates national gov-
ernments and supports them with resources when they apply for them.
In contrast, the migration studies literature has often interpreted the 
development of the European migration field described in this chapter 
through the lens of securitisation. Indeed, security concerns arose in 
anticipation of a supposed loss of control of population movements with 
the establishment of the single market, have motivated developments from 
the TREVI Group to Schengen and Dublin. These studies effectively show 
how actors within and across national and EU- level governance structures 
have developed a consensual view on the apparent security threat posed 
by international migration. Yet, if we focus solely on the securitisation 
of migration, then we lose sight of the role that economic concerns have 
also played. This is particularly visible in relation to areas in which the 
Commission has been able to exert influence, such as free  movement 
TALANI PRINT.indd   300 18/06/2015   11:43
The European Union   301
within the single market and international development in the EU’s 
southern neighbourhood, but this is not all. Indeed, the free movement of 
workers across the EU was defined and agreed by member states in order 
to support the development of the free market. In order to qualify for this 
right, individuals must first be citizens of member states, which is a status 
determined and granted by national governments.
In this way, security and the economy concerns can be seen as key 
drivers of the development of an EU migration policy field. As this chapter 
has shown, national governments have played a central role, although 
decision- making processes are now often channelled through institutions 
and agencies at the EU level. EU institutions and agencies with a stake 
in the governance of international migration are therefore intertwined 
with the national governments that created and defined them. In the face 
of the metaphor of the fortress conjuring up images of an imposing wall 
manned by a unified European border force, migration controls are rather 
better envisaged as an apparatus (Feldman 2012) built up by complex 
interplay among institutions and agencies, and enforced through identity 
documents, databases, repatriation agreements, control measures and so 
on, within and far beyond the territorial limits of the EU’s member states. 
These have expanded, whilst certain types of mobility have been promoted, 
particularly that of EU citizens and, more recently, highly skilled inter-
national workers. The development of migration policies in the EU thus 
marks the establishment of a complex governance system which does not 
necessarily undermine the state, but rather channels its actions and pro-
vides opportunities for national political actors to manage and select types 
of migration in accordance with their security and economic concerns.
NOTES
1. See, for example, Financial Times, Fortress Europe: Immigration, 14 June 2011, Spiegel, 
Fortress Europe: How the EU Turns Its Back on Refugees, 9 October 2013, available 
at http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/asylum- policy- and- treatment- of- refugees- 
in- the- european- union- a- 926939.html (accessed 17 September 2014). The British news-
paper the Guardian even has a dedicated section to its online edition titled ‘Fortress 
Europe’, bringing together articles on migration, available at http://www.theguardian.
com/world/series/fortress- europe (accessed 17 September 2014).
2. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference5IP/07/1575.
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